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An Investigation into 
the Effect of 
“Going Concern” 
Qualifications on the 
Stock Market
By Betty C. Brown and Alan S. Levitan
The auditor’s responsibility when a 
firm’s continued existence is in ques­
tion was addressed in Statement on 
Auditing Standards No. 34. Although 
SAS No. 34 attempts to establish 
some general guidelines for the audi­
tor to consider in formulating his opin­
ion, it does not offer any specific 
criteria for the auditor to follow. On the 
contrary, SAS No. 34 refers to the sub­
jectiveness of the auditor’s opinion.
Identifying the point at which uncer­
tainties about recoverability, classifica­
tions, and amounts require the auditor 
to modify his report is a complex pro­
fessional judgment. No single factor or 
combination of factors is controlling.1
After having accumulated all rele­
vant information, the auditor must rely 
upon his/her own judgment of the 
materiality of the difficulties. He/she 
must ultimately determine the extent 
of disclosure required. If the auditor 
cannot assuage his/her doubts about 
continuity, some sort of qualification or 
disclosure is appropriate. First, how­
ever, the auditor will do all that is 
reasonable to eliminate these doubts, 
usually relying upon evidence that is 
persuasive rather than convincing. 
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Without clearly stated criteria, different 
auditors might issue different reports 
on the same firm. It is possible that a 
“going concern’’ exception is a self- 
fulfilling prophecy: firms that otherwise 
might succeed, could fail because of 
the auditor’s report.
Given the possibility that the audi­
tors’ report may contribute to a firm’s 
failure, it is difficult to test the superi­
ority of the auditor’s ability to predict 
failure over the investor’s ability to 
predict failure, using only market data. 
Nonetheless, auditors are forced into 
the position of “predicting.’’ Moreover, 
it is asserted that auditors have ac­
cess to certain “qualitative’’ (as well 
as additional quantitative) data that 
are not contained in the financial state­
ments. Assuming that the market is 
efficient in the semi-strong form, these 
“qualitative” data that are not publicly 
available should be the only factor 
separating the auditor’s predictive 
ability from the investor’s predictive 
ability.
As an alternative to the “going con­
cern” qualification, these “qualitative” 
characteristics could be disclosed in 
the financial statements. It appears 
appropriate, therefore, to question the 
influence of the auditors’ report on the 
behavior of investors. If investors react 
to a qualified opinion, it may be con­
cluded that they perceive the report to 
contain information. If they do not, all 
the concern about self-fulfilling pro­
phecies would be moot. It must be 
determined whether the report is per­
ceived to contain information before it 
can be decided if there is a better way 
of conveying that information.
This study investigates the relation­
ship of going concern qualifications to 
security price behavior. Because the 
auditor’s report is an integral part of 
the financial statements, it is 
necessary to separate the effect of the 
auditor’s report from the effect of the 
financial statements. This is ac­
complished by pairing a company 
receiving a “going concern” qualifica­
tion with a company having similar 
financial ratios, in the same industry, 
and receiving an unqualified opinion.
Differences between stock market 
reactions of companies receiving “go­
ing concern” qualifications and similar 
companies receiving unqualified opi­
nions were detected. However, the 
reaction began five weeks prior to 
year-end, well before the release of 
the auditor’s report, and continued 
thirty weeks after year-end.
The use of financial ratios as a tool 
for projecting viability was used in a 
classic study by Altman.2 He devel­
oped a model that used five ratios in 
a single formula derived by multi­
variate discriminant analysis (MDA). 
This formula could be applied to the 
ratios of any single year’s financial 
results. His final function was
Z = 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4 
+ 1.0X5 where
X1 = working capital/total assets
X2 = retained earnings/total assets
X3 = earnings before interest and 
taxes/total assets
X4 = market value of equity/book value 
of total assets
X5 = sales/total assets
He found that a Z score less than 
2.675 indicated that a company’s 
financial profile was similar to that of 
companies which had failed.
The semi-strong form of the efficient 
market hypothesis, asserting that the 
prices of securities traded on that 
market fully reflect all publicly avail-
able information, has received sub­
stantial support in the literature. A 
recent study by Lev and Ohlson3 
reviews and summarizes previous 
market-based accounting research.
Firth4 attempted to investigate the 
impact of qualified opinions on inves­
tor decisions. He examined the impact 
by contrasting the market reactions 
toward firms receiving qualified opin­
ions with firms in the same industry 
that received unqualified opinions. He 
found significant differences in the 
reactions for firms receiving “going 
concern’’ qualifications. The primary 
problem with his study is that he did 
not control for the market’s response 
to the financial statements themselves. 
This omission casts serious doubts on 
the validity of his findings.
The familiar Market Model has been 
used to compute residuals. Many mar­
ket studies have used the popular 
cumulative-average-residual (CAR) 
technique, developed by Fama, 
Fisher, Jensen, and Roll,5 of detecting 
changes in security price behavior.6
The period for the test described 
herein began nine weeks preceding 
year-end. Residuals were computed 
and the differences in cumulative 
average residuals for each pair of 
companies were analyzed to see if 
they are significantly different from 
zero. Differences were tested using 
the general paired t-test.7
The Sample
The NAARS data base for 1978 to 
1982 was searched for companies re­
ceiving their first going concern excep­
tion. Twenty-seven companies were 
selected. Altman’s Z value was com­
puted for each company as a surro­
gate for its financial condition at the 
time of the audit exception. Then for 
each company in the sample, Altman’s 
Z was computed for all companies on 
Standard and Poor’s Industrial COM­
PUSTAT file according to the following 
criteria: (1) it must be in the same four­
digit SIC code, (2) its year must end 
within the same COMPUSTAT year, 
and (3) it must be traded on the NYSE 
or the ASE. The company with a Z 
value closest to the original company 
was declared its match, after deter­
mining that the match did not receive 
a going concern exception. Finally, 
security returns for all selected com­
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panies were taken from the Center for 
Research on Security Prices (CRSP) 
daily tapes.
Each of the 27 pairs of companies 
in the sample consists of a company 
receiving its first going concern excep­
tion and its match.
The general t-test was used to com­
pare the means of the Z values for the 
two groups of companies. Test results 
for the entire sample failed to reject 
the null hypothesis that the means of 
the two groups were significantly dif­
ferent; therefore, it is logical to con­
clude that the two groups have similar 
Z values. This supports the underly­
ing premise of the study, that the two 
groups are from the same population 
based upon their financial statement 
characteristics. Moreover, the finan­
cial ratios of both groups resemble fail­
ed companies.
Results and Conclusions
Results of the t-tests on the dif­
ferences between the residuals of the 
companies receiving going concern 
exceptions and their matches, as illu­
strated in Figure 1, indicate that the 
stock market did not react the same 
to the two types of companies. Resid­
uals of zero indicate the security 
prices are behaving as expected. 
Negative residuals reflect a poorer 
than expected performance and posi­
tive residuals show a better then 
expected performance. Differences 
between the residuals became signifi­
cantly different from zero about a 
month before year-end.
The differences in the residuals 
were not significantly different from 
zero for the first five weeks of the 
period of study. This period was well 
after the release of the third quarter 
earnings, but before the release of the 
year-end information. No information 
about either category of company 
should normally have been released 
during this period. The reaction occur­
ring immediately after this period was 
evidently the result of the market’s an­
ticipation of the release of the finan­
cial statements. Also, leaks about the 
going concern qualification may have 
begun prior to year-end.
Generally, the match companies 
have more internal consistency than 
the exception companies, suggesting 
that auditors do not base their excep­
tions, consistently, on financial 
characteristics alone. Except for the 
third week before year-end, standard 
errors (variances) are higher for the 
exception companies and, based 
upon that statistic, the samples repre­
sent two different populations.
All companies in the experiment ex­
hibit worsening performance during 
the time period studied as demon­
strated by the Residuals graph, Figure 
2. However, the performance of those 
which received going concern excep­
tions worsened significantly more than 
that of the companies with matching 
financial characteristics but more 
favorable auditors’ opinions. These 
differences occurred early enough, 
however, to suggest that either (1) the 
auditor’s opinion is a “non-event,” or 
(2) auditors’ evaluations of companies 
are quite similar to those of investors.
It is possible that a “going 
concern’’ exception is a self- 
fulfilling prophecy.
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FIGURE 1
Graph Of The Differences Using 
The Cumulative-Average-Residual Technique
FIGURE 2 
Graph Of The Cumulative-Average-Residuals
WEEKS BEFORE AND AFTER YEAR-END 
□ EXCEPTION I MATCH
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There were strong downward 
movements in the CARs of the excep­
tion companies prior to year-end and 
another slight downward fluctuation 
immediately after year-end, possibly 
indicating negative expectations about 
the contents of the financial state­
ments. On the other hand, the CARs 
of the match companies steadily in­
creased from about two months prior 
to year-end until six weeks afterwards, 
indicating increasingly optimistic ex­
pectations about the contents of the 
financial statements. This suggests 
that the uncertainty preceding the 
release of the annual report was 
greater for the exception companies 
than it was for the match companies. 
This could have been related to 
“leaks” about either the financial con­
dition of the companies or the possi­
bilities of unfavorable opinions.
Nine weeks after year-end, when 
many companies would have released 
their financial statements, the CARs of 
the match companies receiving “clean” 
opinions stabilized at slightly below 
zero and remained relatively constant 
for the remainder of the period of 
study, thus indicating that the stan­
dard auditor’s report had no effect on 
investor behavior. Figure 2 depicts this 
trend. Since the match companies 
have financial statements similar to 
companies receiving going concern 
exceptions, it is not suprising that the 
CARs after the release of the financial 
statements are negative. This indi­
cates that there is some information 
content to the financial statements 
themselves.
The CARs for companies receiving 
going concern exceptions are relative­
ly more volatile over time than their 
clean opinion counterparts. Although 
there was some leveling after week 
six, there was considerably more vari­
ability over time in the CARs of the ex­
ception companies. Also, the residuals 
were more negative for the exception 
companies, suggesting that investors 
were reacting negatively to the con­
tents of the annual report. Since the 
financial statements of the exception 
companies are similar to the financial 
statements of the match companies, 
the most obvious differences in the 
two sets of financial packages is the 
auditor’s report. It appears that in­
vestors are reacting to the auditor’s 
report, or to nonfinancial contrary in­
formation upon which the report is 
based, rather than simply to the finan­
cial statements.
Of course, going concern excep­
tions may affect a company’s ability to 
obtain additional credit, and investors 
may have been reacting to the antici­
pation of more restrictive credit. This 
returns to the self-fulfilling prophecy 
issue. If an investor perceives that a 
going concern exception causes dam­
age to a company’s credit position by 
a greater degree than the financial 
statement ratios, this, in turn, will af­
fect security price behavior.
Further studies are needed to ex­
amine the effect of a going concern 
exception on creditors’ decisions. 
Would a company that otherwise may 
be able to obtain additional debt finan­
cing be denied on the basis of a go­
ing concern exception? If so, bankers 
might need more disclosure with 
respect to auditors’ conclusions. In 
any event, a going concern exception 
does appear to signal increased dif­
ficulties in raising capital in the equity 
market.Ω
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